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An Open Letter to DCA Officials and Other Users of
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judges
by Robert C. Fellmeth and JulianneB. D'Angelo

(CPIL) has long been concerned
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cisions issued by Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH) administrative law
judges (ALJs) by multimember regulatory
boards.' That review of ALJ decisions is
now required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 2 Under the APA, ALJ
decisions are only "proposed decisions" to
the officials controlling the agency. Thus,
the agency officials who make the subsequent and final quasi-adjudicative decision are the same persons who hire and
control those who investigate the case for
the state and decide to file the charges. We
contend that-with proper resources and
the availability of independent, on-point
subject matter expertise where neededALJs are better suited to making consistent and predictable final decisions in individual disciplinary cases.
Rather than reviewing and deciding
disciplinary decisions, regulatory boards
composed of professional and public member volunteers are better suited to monitoring disciplinary proceedings and adopting
broad regulations and standards to deter
abuses. We believe that standardsetting
through rulemaking-which is applicable
to thousands of licensees statewide-is
more protective of consumers' interests
and is a much better use of the limited
time of the volunteer members of multimember regulatory boards than is preoccupation with the fact-based details of
individual disciplinary cases.
With regard to Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) agencies, we first
presented a proposal to enhance the quality of ALI decisionmaking and eliminate
agency review, allowing direct court review for error, in a 1989 report on the
Medical Board's physician discipline
system entitled Physician Discipline in3
California: A Code Blue Emergency.
Our reasoning behind this proposal has
been consistent for five years: Board
members are not present at evidentiary
hearings. They do not see the witnesses
or have an opportunity to judge their
credibility-one hallmark of American
jurisprudence. They do not know of ALJ,
agency, or court decisions in similar

cases. They are not judicially trained,
and have little or no experience in
weighing evidence or knowledge of the
rules of evidence applicable in administrative cases. They may exhibit bias (a
predisposition toward harsh punishment
or lenience) toward wrongdoer colleagues, which-in either direction-is
inappropriate. They meet as a group only
once every two or three months and have
no reasonable opportunity to take decisive action in emergency cases; their required review of ALI proposed decisions
only delays action which could have
been taken months earlier. Board review
of ALJ decisions is also part of a system
of five separate steps and reviews for administrative discipline, which contrasts
with the three-step process for imprisoning violent felons.
Resistance by Bureaucracy. Several
DCA executive officers and enforcement
staff members disagree with the notion
of permitting ALJs to make final disciplinary decisions, and urge retention of
the current system of board review of proposed AU decisions. Some of these individuals have engaged in generalized "ALJ
bashing," contending that some AUs are
incompetent, fail to understand or appreciate the nature of the violation(s) charged
or the evidence produced in certain types
of cases, make erroneous findings of fact
due to their misunderstanding of the subject matter at issue, and are "civil-serviceprotected" employees who are not accountable to the agencies who pay them
to hear cases.
This recent spate of unspecific "ALJ
bashing" appears to have more to do with
maintaining agency "territory" (and defeating our proposal) than it does with documented deficiencies in AU decisionmaking. As in any judicial setting, both the
prosecution and defense sides sometimes
complain about the quality of the judging-usually when an expected judgment
or remedy is not granted.
However, the agency which controls
the executive decision to prosecute and
manages the underlying investigation
should not expect to have all of its preferences reflected in a judicial result. The
implication that such complaints should
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be determinative of judicial error and
that the adjudicative result should be totally controlled by the relevant prosecuting agency is not a credible position.
Moreover, it is impractical, given the fact
of subsequent judicial review. Whether
or not we have the unnecessary step of
agency review, constitutional law requires additional step(s) of judicial review; at that level, persons who lack direct contact with the witnesses seen by
the ALJ and the purported expertise of
the agency in the substantive subject
matter make the decision. Although we
have completed no definitive survey, our
observation of court review over many
years suggests that the decisions of agencies counter to the ALJ's findings and
proposed penalties are substantially more
often reversed by courts than are ALI
rulings left undisturbed by an agency. In
other words, when an agency interferes
(even to "make an example" of a licensee in the direction of greater punishment), courts often side with the more
detached judgment of the ALJ.
When designing a decisionmaking
process, it is best to identify institutions
composed of persons who have requisite
independence and applicable knowledge,
give them additional expertise on point
to the matter in question where needed,
and rely upon them. Rather than five
separate hearings or steps, our proposed
system would provide three steps of
higher quality-the same number we afford criminal defendants. The result is
better decisionmaking, more consistency,
and less expense and time consumed. In
the regulatory-discipline setting, such a
proposed system requires agencies to do
something they generally refuse to do:
give up territory. We believe that agency
officials are in a better position to perform quasi-legislative tasks-to decide
important questions of rulemaking, and
look at the big picture. They are not best
suited to micromanage-for example, to
decide whether John really did sell crack
cocaine to Kathy on April 22 or not.
They are not judges. They do not see the
witnesses.
The ALJs are professionals, not volunteers; they are trained as judges to
1
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evaluate evidence, aware of the concepts
of admissibility and weight, cognizant of
precedent, and they observe the demeanor of the witnesses under examination
and cross-examination under oath. They
are in the best position to make the findings of fact which should then be subject
to single-step judicial review. The agency/
prosecutor is not. Hence, if there are problems with an AU, or with several of them,
those problems should be addressed. The
solution is not to find an alleged lack of
perfection, and use it as an excuse to
move to an institutionally tainted system
which cannot work optimally even if
blessed with a population of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and company as decisionmakers.
The State Bar ModeL California administrative procedure aficionados also
know that the proposed model, wherein
professional ALJs make final adjudicative decisions without referral to the regulatory agency, is not unprecedented. In
1988, Senate Bill 1498 (Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988) overhauled
the State Bar's adjudicative decisionmaking process. Prior to SB 1498, the Bar
used 450 volunteer "hearing referees" to
preside over evidentiary hearings involving attorneys accused of misconduct.
While undoubtedly well-intentioned,
those 450 volunteer lawyers were inadequately trained as judges and had no
guaranteed knowledge of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, the rules of evidence applicable in a State Bar disciplinary proceeding, the area of legal practice
at issue, or other hearing referee and California Supreme Court decisions in similar cases. In an attempt to impose some
level of consistency on the proposed decisions of these attorneys-turned-judges,
the Bar referred all of them to an 18member "Review Department" composed
of twelve attorneys and six public members. The Review Department would meet
once a month, and each of its members
would be assigned to read a proposed decision or two and recommend the appropriate disposition to his/her colleagues.
Needless to say, this model produced inconsistent and unpredictable results, and
effectively encouraged respondent attorneys to "roll the dice" and go to hearing
4
rather than stipulate to discipline.
Encouraged by the California Supreme Court's public remonstration of
the Bar for the poor quality of its adjudicatory decisionmaking, 5 the legislature
passed SB 1498 (Presley) in 1988. The
bill wiped away the panel of 450 hearing
referees and replaced it with six fulltime, professional, independent State Bar
Court judges to preside over disciplinary

hearings. And it eliminated the 18-member review panel and replaced it with a
three-judge Review Department. All of
these judges are appointed directly by
the California Supreme Court. SB 1498
also required the Bar to publish the State
Bar Court Reporter, a compendium of
State Bar Court and California Supreme
Court attorney disciplinary decisions, to
encourage a stare decisis-type consistency. These judges specialize in a specific type of adjudicatory case, thereby
enabling them to gain expertise in deciding them. They make the final agency
disciplinary decision-not the Bar's
Board of Governors. As a result, the
State Bar's disciplinary decisionmaking
process is the first in the nation to be
completely free from the
influence of the
6
practicing profession.
Now four years old, the new system
has just survived its first test-an indepth external review by a distinguished
committee chaired by U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Senior Judge Arthur L.
Alarc6n. In its report following months
of investigation and public hearings, the
Alarc6n Committee recognized the improved decisionmaking of the revamped
State Bar Court:
The State Bar Court has...met
with remarkable success. In 1993,
the State Bar Court disposed of 201
more cases than it did in the preceding year, and 18% more than the
total number filed. Even more impressive is the confidence shown
by the Supreme Court in the integrity of the work of the State Bar
Court. In 1990-91, the Supreme
Court granted a writ of review in 30
cases. In 1992, I writ was granted.
None were granted in 1992 and
1993.7
Whereas some members of the press
and the Medical Board (in a patent attempt to defeat CPIL's proposal) have
emphasized the Alarc6n Committee's
criticisms of the State Bar for overstaffing its disciplinary system, that overstaffing has only become apparent after
four years, and it is due to unanticipated
and welcome efficiencies flowing from
the new system (if only the Medical
Board "suffered" such efficiencies!). The
Alarc6n Committee recognized that the
consistency and predictability of State
Bar Court decisionmaking is encouraging more and more respondent attorneys
to stipulate to discipline without going
to hearing, or to accept the decision of
the hearing judge without appeal. As a
result, the once-staggering workload of
the State Bar's adjudicative system has
decreased significantly. With regard to

the hearing judges, the Alarc6n Committee stated:
The State Bar Court has more
judges and staff than necessary to
meet its statutory function... .The
light caseload of the hearing judges
has permitted them to spend onehalf of their time writing scholarly
twenty-page opinions in every case
before them....There is no legal requirement for this costly busy
work... .The number of hearing department judges should be reduced
from six to four and the proposed
seventh position should not be
filled....The trial department's practice of writing and issuing lengthy
memorandum opinions in all cases
8
should be substantially reduced.
And as to the Review Department,
the Alarc6n Committee found:
A further measure of the quality
of the work of the State Bar Court
is that in 1993, appeals were filed
before the Review Department in
less than 11% of the decisions of
the hearing judges. In 1993, 40
opinions were filed by the judges of
the Review Department. In the first
six months of this year, 18 opinions
have been filed. It is obvious from
these figures that three judges, supported by full-time secretaries, research or staff attorneys, and clerical personnel, are no longer necessary to support the diminishing
load of the Review Department....
The number of Review Department
Judges should be reduced from three
to two...[and] [s]upport staff9 should
be reduced commensurably.
Thus, far from criticizing the decisionmaking quality or structure of the new
State Bar Court, the Alarc6n Committee
has upheld its integrity and recognized efficiencies in the new system which were
unexpected even by its creators. The point?
This is a system which has merit, has been
tried, and works. It works so well it can
ultimately save rather than cost money, if
properly implemented. Rather than bashing
the OAH AUs for unspecified sins, DCA
boards and other agencies which utilize
OAH ALs should look to the Bar's model
and replicate it-eliminate the unnecessary
agency review of proposed AU decisions,
allow ALJs to be grouped into specialty
panels reviewing a specific type of case
where complexity and a critical mass of
cases so warrant, and enjoy its consistency,
predictability, and cost savings.
Specific Criticisms. Aside from generalized concerns about ALJ competency
to make final decisions, some DCA Executive Officers and enforcement staff
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officials have registered specific complaints about OAH ALJs, including the
following:
- They frequently fail to apply the relevant agency's disciplinary guidelines in
recommending a proposed penalty, and
fail to explain why their recommendation does not utilize the agency's suggested penalty.
- They are not adhering to the 30-day
requirement in Government Code section
11517(b), and sometimes take four to six
months after case submission to forward
a proposed decision to the agency.
- They are neither granting cost recovery when it is prayed for in an accusation, nor explaining why they have
failed to grant it.10

CPIL is concerned about the problems DCA officials have expressedboth the general concerns about AL
competence to issue final decisions and
the more specific problems listed above.
We share the agencies' stated interest in
improving the system by providing
greater protection for consumers from incompetent, impaired, or dishonest practitioners, while simultaneously providing
requisite due process.
CPIL herewith invites DCA agencies
and others which utilize OAH ALJs to
substantiate the problems which have been
alleged in conclusory fashion. Send us evidence of specific cases in which you have
experienced problems with OAH ALJs.
Send us specific AU opinions which exhibit the problems described above. Where
feasible, include empirical statistics about
the frequency of the problem(s) described.
For example, if OAH ALJs took four
months after submission (instead of 30
days) to forward proposed decisions in six
cases from an agency last year, identify
whether OAH heard a total of six or 60
cases from that agency last year. In other
words, provide information which places
the complaint(s) in statistical perspective.
Officials of DCA boards and other
agencies which utilize OAH ALJs and
the APA adjudicative process owe it to
the citizenry they serve to provide constructive and illuminating documentation. It is neither possible nor advisable
to improve this process based on anecdotal evidence or conclusory allegations.
Prove your case factually. If you expect
to influence public policy, we're all from
Missouri: Show us. That is a burden others have properly assumed, and agency
officials will have little credibility until
they shoulder it as well.
Most of the information needed is
within agency domain. Let's see it.
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